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The Wonder-Clause
Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati *

Abstract
The Greek debt crisis prompted EU officials to embark on a radical reconstruction of the
European sovereign debt markets. Prominently featured in this reconstruction was a set of
contract provisions called Collective Action Clauses, or CACs. CACs are supposed to help
governments and private creditors to renegotiate unsustainable debt contracts, and obviate the
need for EU bailouts. But European sovereign debt contacts were already amenable to
restructuring; adding CACs could make it harder. Why, then, promote CACs at all, and cast
them in such a central role in the market reform initiative? Using interviews with participants
in the initiative and those affected by it, as well as observations at policy and academic
meetings, we attempt to shed light on the puzzle and draw implications for the role of
contract techniques in market construction.
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Introduction
Contract terms are technical devices. In law and in finance literature alike, they allocate risks,
map responses to future contingencies, and ultimately impact the price of the contracted product
or service. This description is also the departure point for explaining the behavior of lawyers,
bankers, and traders who deal in contracts. If we showed up to a contracts conference claiming
that a famous contract term did little for the contracting parties, served primarily to communicate
governments’ role in a financial market, but had no capacity to play that role, we would be
dismissed as crackpots. Yet this is what we found studying some of the best known financial
contract terms of our time. For over a decade, the set of Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in
sovereign debt contracts has acted more like a symbol than a technique, appropriated by parties
and nonparties alike in an effort to shape the markets where they trade, and to negotiate their
place in the markets. In this article, we trace how CACs evolved from one of many technical
devices designed to operate between contract parties, to a prominent public symbol and policy
tool in two financial crises. We use the story of CACs’ rise to consider the uses of contracts and
the law’s role in the construction of modern sovereign debt markets.
As a technical matter, CACs enable creditor majorities to bind potential holdouts in a debt
restructuring vote. Terms that limit the power of holdouts are valuable to sovereigns, which
cannot restructure their debts in bankruptcy and must rely on sovereign immunity and
contractual mechanisms to manage debt distress. Although CACs can be found in bonds going
back decades, they were first mooted as a response to modern sovereign debt crises after the $50
billion official rescue of Mexico in 1995. They were widely adopted soon after Argentina’s
record-breaking debt default in 2001. CACs’ rapid market-wide adoption starting in 2003 was
an achievement in global financial governance (Helleiner 2009); in private contract terms, it was
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a revolution. The CAC revolution was prominently described as a triumph of market forces over
clumsy, top-down state regulation: with a gentle nudge from the official sector, market actors
changed their contracts en masse to make unavoidable debt restructuring more orderly, reduce
coordination problems and deadweight losses from long default, and improve the incentives for
sustainable debt management (Taylor 2007, Quarles 2010). To be sure, CACs had hardly been
used, there was no empirical evidence one way or another connecting them to more orderly
restructurings, and good reasons to doubt their promised effect—but the public story took hold.
Part of our project is to understand how and why it did.
Seeking insight into the revolution, we conducted a series of interviews with market and
policy actors between 2004 and 2006. We found that market participants did not view CACs
with anything near the enthusiasm that their rapid diffusion and accompanying policy publicity
might have suggested. All but a few policy makers were similarly skeptical. In public, CACs
were touted as a private ordering coup that obviated the need for bankruptcy and bailouts alike.
In private, those CACs that were adopted were often viewed as a minor change, unlikely to
transform sovereign restructurings (Gelpern and Gulati 2007). The disjunction between public
and private stories was jarring.
CACs were hard to explain as a policy tool. They also presented a contracts puzzle. Having
interviewed dozens of people involved in drafting and negotiating CACs in 2003, we gained a
measure of insight into the intent of the contracting parties adopting these clauses, and were in a
position to chronicle something like a legislative history for this set of boilerplate provisions that
seemed to channel the collective will of the sovereign debt market at the time (Choi and Gulati
2006). Drafters and negotiators told us that CACs got into their contracts for a variety of
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contradictory reasons; scarcely any of these had to do with facilitating creditor collective action
or even more broadly, the clauses’ utility as among the parties.
Roughly a decade later, the puzzle returned. There was a debt crisis in Europe, and CACs
were once again an early and prominent part of the policy response. This time, they looked even
less suited to fight the crisis at hand or those that might follow. Based on our earlier interviews,
we suspected that many or most of the policy makers invoking CACs as a potent fix knew better.
Why did they resuscitate CACs?
The answer reveals a gap in the traditional conception of financial contract terms as technical
devices that allocate risk or manage relationships. Contracts and contract terms can perform a
more public role: in the events we study, we find that they have served as a tool for policy
makers to construct an identity for a particular market, and the hierarchy of assets within it.
CACs’ principal early success was at preempting bankruptcy-style public ordering alternatives in
the sovereign debt markets. As CACs spread and gained symbolic value as anti-bankruptcy, their
technical value as restructuring tools looked minor by comparison. CACs’ efficacy at
restructuring was so unimportant by 2010, that when a new bailout-free sovereign debt market
had to be constructed and sold to the taxpaying public in Europe, CACs became a featured
building block even though as a technical matter, they were at best a costly distraction, and even
risked undermining the new policy.
The fact that CACs had to be adopted for reasons apart from their capacity for creditor
coordination did not make their technical attributes irrelevant. These attributes—the voting
mechanics and thresholds, the similarities and differences between European and emerging
markets CACs, and the way in which they fit in the institutional context of European debt and
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crisis management—reflected CACs’ messaging task. CACs in Europe had multiple political
missions, ranging from signaling a new economic bargain among the center, the periphery, and
the market, to articulating uniform crisis management rules, to promoting market discipline, to
helping European states differentiate themselves from their emerging markets counterparts. The
way in which they were drafted had to support these multiple missions simultaneously. To
channel the parties’ intent properly, CACs had to be many things to many people.
Our case study examines CACs both as a policy and as a contract phenomenon. It seeks to
advance our understanding of how law constructs finance (Pistor 2013) by illuminating
government actors’ use of private law techniques to shape the identity of financial markets (cf.
Riles 2011). From the contracts perspective, we try to make sense of CACs’ capacity to channel
multiple apparently conflicting party imperatives, and mediate between contracting parties and
various political constituencies. Our study is based on over ninety interviews with officials,
market participants, and lawyers, as well as observations at more than a dozen policy and
academic meetings.
Part I of the article provides a brief overview of sovereign debt markets. Part II describes
contract theories that might shed light on the CAC debate. Part III draws on our interviews to
chart the ascent of CACs through successive financial crises. Part IV considers implications.
CACs went from an arcane legal technique offered as a harmless “deliverable” in the late 1990s
to a means for negotiating the allocation of risks, the terms of financial backing, and the scope of
sovereignty in the world’s biggest financial markets. Their story testifies both to the potency and
to the limits of private law techniques in constructing markets.
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Part I: Big Debt and Little Debt
At the start of 2012, the world’s governments had over $40 trillion in outstanding
medium and long-term debt securities. Of the total, 1.4% or just over $600 billion represented
debt issued by low and middle-income countries under foreign law. Debt issued by wealthy
countries under their respective domestic laws accounted for 83.2%, attributable mostly to the
United States, Japan, and Europe. Although the precise breakdown has varied, the overall
relationship among the four categories of debt in Figure 1 has changed little throughout the
period we discuss, between the mid-1990s and 2012.
Figure 1: Domestic and International Sovereign Debt by Issuer Category 1

Source: Bank for International Settlements, BIS Securities Statistics and Syndicated Loans

Governments have traditionally placed the bulk of their debt with their own citizens, at
home, in their own currency, and under their own laws (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). However,

1

BIS Securities Statistics and Syndicated Loans, Tables 12D and 16A, as of December 2011, available at
http://www.bis.org/statistics/secstats.htm. Data exclude short-term securities, with remaining maturity under one
year.
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wealthy countries have long had the privilege of selling their local currency, local law debt to
foreign creditors. For example, the United States as the issuer of the world’s reserve currency
owes slightly less than half of its debt in the hands of the public to foreign creditors (U.S.
Treasury 2012). Developing countries have only recently begun to issue significant amounts of
domestic debt to foreign creditors (Inter-American Development Bank 2006). For some
Eurozone members, this capacity to issue domestic law debt to a global audience coincides with
adopting the Euro (Gulati and Smets 2013).
Domestic and foreign sovereign bond contracts look different. Domestic contracts are
often short, sometimes no more than a few lines in a law or regulation. The terms are not always
readily accessible to the public–and not always in English (ICMA 2011). 2 Drafting work on
these terms is generally done in-house by finance, economy, or justice ministry lawyers, who
work with the sovereign’s debt managers. Domestic sovereign debt is generally exempt from
securities disclosure rules applicable to private issuers and tends to be sold in public auctions,
rather than through investment bank-managed or underwritten offerings. Domestic debt offerings
also do not normally use outside fiscal agents or trustees—representing the issuer and the
bondholders, respectively—to transmit payments, information, and otherwise manage the day-to-

2
Information on domestic debt issuance in Mexico and Brazil is instructive. These countries’ governments have
become the leaders in emerging market public debt management and investor relations; however, their websites—
much as the U.S. Treasury’s—reference domestic laws, regulations, and auction rules, with no links to anything that
looks like a traditional debt contract. Compare Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Domestic Debt, at
http://www.hacienda.gob.mx/English/public_credit_new/domestic_debt/Paginas/DOMESTICDEBT.aspx (Mexico),
Ministerio da Fazenda, Tesouro Nacional, Domestic Debt, at https://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/en/domesticmarket/domestic-public-bonds (Brazil), and U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Public Debt,
TreasuryDirect, Treasury Marketable Securities, at
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/RT/RTGateway?page=institMktbles (United States). Contrast this to the disclosure
and documentation of public external debt, for example, in Mexico, where contracts are extensively described in the
readily-available prospectus. Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, External Debt, Government Securities
Issued in the International Market, at
http://www.hacienda.gob.mx/English/public_credit_new/external_debt/Paginas/GOVERNMENTSECURITIESISS
UEDINTHEINTERNATIONALMARKETS.aspx.
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day administration of the debt instrument once it is issued. Instead, such administrative work is
typically done within the government or by special arrangement with domestic institutions.3
Governments usually have the largest and most liquid domestic debt markets, and are
generally regarded as the safest issuers in their jurisdiction. Their debts serve as benchmarks for
pricing the debt of all other issuers. At home, government debt is often the closest thing to
money. But its attraction to investors is not always due to its sterling credit quality. Governments
can create markets in their debt by regulating financial institutions within their jurisdictions. For
example, regulators let banks hold no capital against their own government debt, in contrast to
private sector loans. Pension funds are told to keep a portion of their investments in safe, liquid
assets, comprising mostly government debt. Central banks lend against government debt
collateral. Put differently, the “money” status of government debt can be decreed, at least at
home.
A government’s capacity to create a market in its debt weakens beyond the national
borders. Favorable regulatory treatment abroad requires international cooperation, which is hard
to achieve. Although the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision and the European Union each
provide for the risk-free treatment of some foreign government debt for bank regulatory purposes
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1999; European Parliament, 2006; Hannoun 2011), it
is not the general rule. The result is a paradox: at the extreme, particularly in poorer countries,
the same instrument can be risk-free and in demand at home, but unwanted abroad. In the global
hierarchy of financial assets, some sovereign debt is clearly more money-like than the rest, a
state of affairs reinforced by regulatory harmonization via Basel and Brussels.

3

For example, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York serves as fiscal agent for the U.S. Treasury.

8

Submission Draft b February 2, 2013 – Comments Welcome

Some government debt enjoys similarly high status at home and abroad. Owing to their
deep markets, wealthy economies, regulatory reach, and other factors, the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Germany among others, are able to issue debt that is considered risk free
and serves as a reliable store of value for foreign individuals, institutions, and central banks.
Market participants beyond these issuers’ regulatory reach have come to treat their debt like
cash. It sits atop of the asset hierarchy.
Contracts do not figure prominently in the life of government debt held within the
issuer’s jurisdiction, and money-like debt described in the preceding paragraph. Factors other
than contracts— an abundance of resources and political stability, deep markets, or a captive
audience, among others—are assumed to guarantee its safety. This “information-insensitive”
quality (Cf. Gorton 2009) may explain market tolerance for poor and heterogeneous
documentation of domestic debt, notably in the Eurozone (Gulati and Smets 2013). On the other
hand, debt contracts with acknowledged credit risk, such as those used by developing countries
to raise money from foreign investors, tend to be standardized, elaborate, and mind-numbingly
long. Their issuance is concentrated for the most part in two jurisdictions, England and New
York. Whereas money-like debt at the core of the global financial system is documented inhouse, contracts for debt on the periphery of the system are drafted by elite law firms, and their
marketing is done by top investment banks. Even though the disclosure requirements for foreign
sovereigns are looser than those applicable to private issuers, foreign debt disclosure is
substantial and much more readily accessible compared to its domestic counterpart.
Apart from money-like debt, all other government debt derives its value from a mix of
the debtor’s capacity and willingness to pay, contractual safeguards, and third-party backing.
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Such backing is rarely explicit. 4 However, creditors have long relied on rich governments for
repayment of their loans to the less fortunate. In the early 20th century, this might have meant
“gunboat diplomacy,” or taking over debtors’ customs houses to collect revenues for the
creditors’ account (Ahmed et al. 2010). In the late 20th century, this meant “bailouts,” or rescue
financing from rich countries and multilateral institutions, which went to repay foreign
bondholders when their debtors ran out of funds (Bulow and Rogoff 1988b, Roubini and Setser
2004). Unlike gunboat diplomacy, latter-day bailouts were never justified in terms of helping the
creditors. Rather, the implicit backing of sovereign debt was a response to externalities from
sovereign debt crises, notably the fear of financial contagion.
In the late 1990s, the foreign bond contracts of developing countries became the site of a
legal and political reform campaign initiated by the rich countries. As financial crises
proliferated, pressure for bailouts intensified, and rescue packages grew bigger, the rich decided
to step back. In lieu of bailouts, or at least as a complement to them, Group of Seven officials
insisted that sovereign debtors and their creditors renegotiate their contracts and absorb some or
all of the resulting losses. Reform advocates in the official sector needed a tangible way to
advance this policy: it is one thing to say that debtors and creditors were on their own, quite
another to make them believe you would stand idly by as contagion wreaked havoc on the world
economy. Ideally, the promise to back off should come with a package of concrete policy
initiatives that would make it more credible. This search for concrete initiatives prompted a turn
to legal technique.
Part II: Theory and Opportunity

4

For example, developing countries issued “Brady Bonds” partly backed by U.S. Treasury securities as part of the
initiative to end the 1980s debt crisis. (Buckley 1998)
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A. Theories for the Revolution
The term “Collective Action Clauses” emerged in the late 1990s to describe a set of
contract provisions that make it easier for bondholders to coordinate among themselves in a
sovereign debt crisis. They include, among others, provisions to facilitate amendment of debt
contracts by majority vote, structures for collective representation of bondholders, and
procedures to initiate negotiations in debt distress. While most of the clauses have been around
in some form for many decades, they became a team, got their name, and shot to stardom when
officials started pushing for their adoption in the wake of the 1995 financial crisis in Mexico—
and even more so after Argentina’s default in 2001. CACs were part of the public sector’s
program of promoting orderly crisis management, an antidote to bailouts. However, they also
had a very specific technical job in the policy program: according to rich-country officials, CACs
were needed to overcome the New York custom of giving individual bondholders veto power
over amendment. About half of all emerging markets foreign sovereign (including most Latin
American) debt was being issued under New York law at the time. These contracts were
presumed immutable.
As the clauses began to figure prominently in official pronouncements, the “CAC” label
stuck, though the content behind the label has shifted over time. One category of CACs—the
majority amendment provisions, which specifically counter the unanimous consent practice in
New York—has progressively eclipsed representation, initiation, and the rest in market and
policy discourse. Majority amendment above all solved multiple theoretical problems at once.
Law practitioners, market participants, and policy makers debating CACs on the merits readily
deploy the theoretical arguments. We begin by following their lead to consider the theoretical
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explanations of CACs’ function as a contractual device to improve the performance of sovereign
bonds. These fit in two major categories: coordination and modification.
Coordination. At the most basic level, as their name suggests, collective action clauses
are designed to solve coordination problems. These problems are not limited to modification but
are simply present whenever multiple parties to a contract (such as all bondholders in a bond
issue) cannot agree on a course of action in the common interest. For example, a variant of a
collective action clause requires a subset of bondholders to agree to accelerate the debt in the
event of default—and a larger subset to rescind acceleration. Other collective action problems in
bond contracts might involve decisions to sue or waive minor infractions; solutions include
delegating powers to a bondholder representative such as a trustee, or a separate majority vote. If
each bondholder acted in its individual interest, the result might be a fire sale, a rush to the court
house, or a race to strip a debtor’s assets—all of which are ruinous for the bondholders as a
group, not to mention the debtor. Where each creditor has veto power—as was the custom in
New York law bond contracts before 2003--individual bondholders might be tempted to disrupt
or free-ride on a debt restructuring, prolonging a crisis and delaying recovery.
Bankruptcy law (inapplicable to sovereigns) offers a set of solutions to such problems;
some or all of these may also be replicated with contract clauses. (Eichengreen 2003, Jackson
1986) From this vantage point, CACs are a private and selective adaptation of bankruptcy
technique, which does not necessarily import the structure, values, or many other functions of a
statutory bankruptcy regime.
Some of CACs’ appeal might be explained by the textbook quality in which they paired
expected problems with accepted answers. Empirical evidence of coordination problems in
modern sovereign bonds was limited and anecdotal at the time CACs first came up as a policy
12
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initiative in the mid-1990s. The emerging market sovereign bond market which they were meant
to reform had only been in existence in its modern form for a few years. Rich country bonds
were thought to be risk-free and were spared the need to think about distress. While market
participants groused about policy makers solving imaginary problems, officials pointed to a few
high-profile lawsuits and predicted more to come. Empirical evidence so far has not borne out
these predictions (Bi et al 2011). Bond restructurings have been relatively quick and smooth
(Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2007), and litigation relatively rare (Enderlein et al 2012).
It bears emphasis that this evidence does not suggest that CACs were useless as a
technical device to help restructurings go more smoothly. Rather, the claim is that they were not
essential to solve a pressing problem in sovereign debt management. Either the problem was not
big, or some combination of background law and market adaptation had found good-enough
ways to solve it (Panizza et al., 2011). Nevertheless, CACs retained both common sense and
high-end theoretical appeal as a solution to coordination problems.
Modification. As noted earlier, the majority amendment provision is by far the most
famous CAC of all. In its most common form, it allows a majority of bondholders to amend the
financial terms of a bond and bind the dissenters. Advocates for CACs argue that it is irrational
for sovereigns to omit modification provisions in their contracts, because the result is a high cost
of negotiating with creditors in crisis. The counter argument here is that, in theory, rational
debtors seeking to raise funds might want to make renegotiation tough to signal their confidence
that they will never have to restructure. Advocates respond that sovereign debtors are already
deeply reluctant to restructure; additional incentives would make no difference (Buchheit and
Gulati 2002). Other explanations for why CACs were not adopted earlier and more widely
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include first-mover problems, network externalities causing contract stickiness, and bounded
rationality (Eichengreen 2003).
Again, the public debate about CACs has been a textbook reflection of the academic
debate. If CACs materially increased moral hazard on the part of sovereign debtors, causing
weak ones to restructure willy-nilly, then it made sense for creditors and strong debtors to oppose
CACs. If all sovereign debtors already had adequate incentives against default, CACs would be a
welcome tool to reduce deadweight losses in distress.
In sum, CACs came with an impressive theoretical pedigree. But while theory framed
arguments for and against CACs, it did not dictate an outcome. Empirical evidence of
coordination and modification problems would take years to collect, and even then would prove
inconclusive. CACs’ rapid and widespread adoption beginning in 2003 did not come about
because anyone had found proof of coordination problems, nor because sovereigns had
dispensed with creditors’ warnings of moral hazard. Instead, CACs owed their success to a
peculiar confluence of events and personalities that turned the next financial crisis into political
opportunity.

B.

Tequila Sunrise

CACs were first mooted as an answer to sovereign debt crises after the 1995 U.S. and IMF
rescue package for Mexico, which topped $40 billion. 5 Although the loan was quickly repaid
and made money for the U.S. Treasury, it caused much political, policy, and academic

5

There is some, albeit sparse, evidence that CACs had a prior incarnation as a solution to the world’s problems in
the early 1920s. The Czech Republic used what we believe to be the first CAC in a sovereign bond issued in 1922;
a bond that was subsequently restructured in 1946. That initiative did not, however, result in widespread adoption of
CACs. See Weidemaier (2012).
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consternation (Rubin 2003). Critics complained that the package bailed out reckless private
lenders and sovereign borrowers, and created expectations that public money would be on offer
from here on out, along with perverse incentives to accumulate unsustainable debts. The
response was twofold: first, the rescue package was the only alternative to a Mexican bond
default, which would have untold consequences for the global markets and the U.S. economy;
and second, to avoid future bailouts, emerging market governments would change their bond
contracts to make restructuring a plausible option.
The view that bond restructuring would be unfathomably messy was generally held, and had
an air of a truth that went without saying (Euromoney 1995, Buchheit 1998, 1999). Some of the
explanations stressed the nature of bonds as widely held, tradable instruments prone to
coordination problems (even though some bonds are more closely held and less liquid than loan
participations). But most practitioners, market participants, and academics ultimately blamed the
New York custom of requiring each bondholder to approve a change in financial terms, which
made sovereign bonds effectively immune to restructuring. 6 Mexico was the prime example of
the problem, since it was one of the biggest issuers of sovereign bonds in New York. Once the
problem was identified as New York contracts, it had a ready solution: either to change the
contracts themselves, or to trump them with statutory bankruptcy.
The glitch in characterizing the problem as New York contracts in 1995 was that this
particular Mexican debt crisis did not implicate its New York law bonds. The culprit instruments
were domestic Tesobonos: Mexican-law, dollar-indexed debt that exploded as the Mexican peso
fell. To this day, no policy or academic work has reproduced or analyzed the restructuring

6

No statute or case law mandated this practice; we return to this point in the next section.
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provisions of Tesobonos. Everything we know about the 1995 crisis suggests that such
provisions, if they existed, did not figure prominently in the rescue decision. And even if
Tesobonos had contained a flat bar to restructuring, Mexico had a trump card against its
bondholders—the power to enact a law to restructure the bonds by fiat. To be sure, creditors
would have complained, and might even have shut Mexico out of the markets. Moreover, a
restructuring might have caused contagion. But a majority “cramdown” of new terms over the
objections of some creditors could have had much the same result. Reluctance to restructure
Tesobonos was not for lack of legal tools, but for fear of economic consequences.
In fairness to the policy makers and academics who pressed for CACs then, many of them
looked beyond Tesobonos at the large stock of New York law foreign sovereign bonds, and tried
to expand policy options for the next sovereign crisis. But the next crisis, which struck in 1997,
happened in Asia and involved corporate and bank debt, which could be restructured in
bankruptcy. Corporate bankruptcy reform was the answer (Halliday and Carruthers 2009). By
2000, it became apparent that even sovereign bonds with unanimity provisions were not
restructuring-proof. That year, Ecuador engineered a debt exchange that produced record levels
of debt relief with the participation of over 90% of its bondholders, notwithstanding New Yorkstyle unanimity in its debt contracts. Not until Argentina’s default in 2001 did collective action
problems in foreign sovereign bonds begin to sound like a plausible obstacle to restructuring,
with CACs as a plausible, though hardly a critical, solution.
Five years after their public debut, 7 CACs had become familiar to policy wonks from the late
1990s summit statements and expert reports. The academic research machine had revved up to

7

The academic and policy effort to promote CACs started with Eichengreen & Portes (1995), whose paper fed into
the Rey Report (1996).
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produce theoretical and empirical studies for a decade to come. However, few high-level
officials would spend political capital on their implementation. According to one U.S. official, “it
was not number one, number two, or number three” on the policy agenda. 8 To most, CACs were
a harmless legal technique that made the customary litany of deliverables sound specific and
constructive, and might help on the margins in crisis. Politicians might praise CACs in the
occasional speech, but they would not antagonize investors to mandate them. And when markets
calmed down, CACs receded from public view to collect dust in the files of law firm associates
and mid-level bureaucrats.

C.

Contract Control and Contract Autonomy

By the turn of the 21st century and the onset of Argentina’s debt crisis, the academic and
policy consensus had shifted in CACs’ favor. This was less a function of empirical proof than of
bureaucratic repetition; CACs had become embedded in the G-7 crisis agenda. With the new
consensus in place, sovereign bond contracts now embodied a double theoretical conundrum:
they were written to exacerbate coordination problems among bondholders, and failed to change
when these problems were publicized in the late 1990s. Although investors continued to insist
that states restructured opportunistically, and therefore that CACs were undesirable, law
practitioners routinely attributed the persistence of unanimity to blind copying by bleary-eyed
associates from corporate bonds (Cf. Weidemaier, Gulati and Scott 2012, Gelpern and Gulati
2007).
The combined diagnosis of coordination problems and “stickiness” of apparently suboptimal
terms suggested a market failure, and mobilized theories for public intervention. Government

8

Interview 102105.
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action in the form of education, coordination, and moral suasion was especially appropriate if
unanimity in New York had been a product of blind copying, rather than a deliberate effort to
discipline the debtor, signal commitment, or extort the public sector. Officials had tried some
educating, coordinating, and suading back in the 1990s. But that public relations campaign
failed to convince market actors to shift to CACs.
We have argued elsewhere that the shift in New York bond contracts in 2003 came in
response to a more muscular proposal by the IMF to resolve coordination problems with a treatybased sovereign bankruptcy regime (Gelpern and Gulati 2007). The enduring policy salience of
the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) was a surprise to many observers. It was
in large part a product of the idiosyncratic leadership at the U.S. Treasury and the IMF, the U.S.
political transition, Argentina’s debt crisis, and even the attacks of 9/11 (Setser 2010). U.S.
Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill raised sovereign bankruptcy at a getting-to-know-you breakfast
with top IMF officials in August 2001, while discussing Argentina. He publicly proposed it
shortly thereafter, in his first testimony after September 11. O’Neill’s senior staff present at the
breakfast said they did not expect the IMF to run with the idea, which came up spontaneously
and had not been vetted within the George W. Bush Administration. But that is exactly what the
IMF did, led by Deputy Managing Director Anne O. Krueger, encouraged by the perception of
support elsewhere in the Administration, among European governments and some debt relief
advocates in the civil society (Setser 2010, Gelpern and Gulati 2007).
As the bankruptcy proposal gained speed, O’Neill’s deputy, Treasury Under Secretary John
B. Taylor, did what no official before him had done: orchestrate an all-out campaign to
implement CACs. Taylor was a passionate opponent of recent IMF interventions in financial
crises. He was uncomfortable with O’Neill’s bankruptcy lurch, which was a top-down public fix
18
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to sovereign debt problems, inconsistent with Taylor’s and the Administration’s free market
outlook. A prominent academic economist, Taylor was also the only senior official who
consistently and forcefully made a case for CACs as a direct path to stopping bailouts. To be
sure, no one seriously contested CACs’ capacity to encourage coordination in some states of the
world, and no one in the official sector argued that they were harmful. But Taylor was unique for
his genuine faith in CACs’ bigger policy potential, and his willingness to devote personal and
political capital to making them happen. He called finance officials, met with investors and
investment banks, hosted seminars, gave speeches, and commissioned contract drafting ideas
under the auspices of the G-10—the group that first mooted CACs in a 1996 report (Taylor 2002,
2007, Quarles 2010). The G-10 experts, led by Taylor’s deputy Randal Quarles, asked a group of
eminent lawyers to prepare sample clauses. (Group of Ten 2002) These became influential in
shaping market adoption of CACs in 2003, and in their European revival in 2010.
The SDRM proposal remained on the international policy agenda for over a year, and came
to be seen as a formidable threat by opponents of official intervention in the sovereign debt
markets. The awkward combination of O’Neill’s bankruptcy mandate and Taylor’s commitment
to the contractual alternative, aided perhaps by higher-level inattention, meant that both
bankruptcy and contracts were being pursued on parallel tracks. Partly thanks to the inevitable
competition between the two policy tracks, the outreach campaign intensified tremendously, with
studies, meetings, and public events on both sides.
For their part, investors suddenly faced a problem much bigger than contract clauses that
might, on the margin, help opportunistic sovereigns restructure: they faced a treaty proposal that
could be the first step to more muscular public ordering in the global sovereign debt market
(Kaiser 2010). It is doubtful whether the SDRM, which entailed rather modest steps to overcome
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collective action problems and resolve disputes, ever had the potential to turn into real sovereign
bankruptcy (IMF 2003). But mere talk of bankruptcy was threatening and disruptive, if allowed
to go on. Debtors and private creditors appeared united in their opposition to the SDRM on the
grounds that it (and even the talk of “it”) would raise borrowing costs and dramatically reduce
the availability of funds for emerging markets sovereigns. As with other positions in this area,
this was at best a hunch; there was no empirical evidence one way or another for the cost of
bankruptcy. But when a treaty regime seemed ever so slightly plausible—and with it a more
fundamental overhaul of the global sovereign debt market—borrowing governments and their
bondholders became more enthusiastic about adopting CACs as a means of foreclosing further
discussion of such a regime.
By late 2003, CAC proponents in the official sector declared victory. Mexico issued a New
York law bond with CACs in February; within months, issuers were switching in droves, and by
year-end, 70 to 80% of all new emerging markets sovereign debt issued in the New York had
CACs (Bradley and Gulati 2012). This singular success story unfolded against the background of
protagonists, including Mexican officials, stubbornly claiming that they saw no need to solve
phantom coordination problems, but instead adopted CACs to destroy the bankruptcy initiative.
One apocryphal story has a high-ranking Mexican finance official declaring after the pilot issue,
“We killed the motherfucker!”, referring to the SDRM. (Int.C7)
Killing the unmentionable was only part of the story. The way in which the early adopters
went about introducing CACs revealed different political tensions. Large emerging market
sovereigns such as Mexico and Brazil resented the official sector’s attempts to meddle with their
market and their private bond contracts. On the other hand, the G-7 and the IMF saw such
intervention as their prerogative: the bailouts of the 1990s and early 2000s proved that the
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market rested on their implicit guarantee, and they wanted at least a say on the terms of the
guarantee (Cf. Bulow and Rogoff 1988). By 2003, the newly creditworthy issuers saw any
guarantee as a relic of the past, and claimed sovereign autonomy over their debt markets,
including their contracts. Mexico’s decision to move first, with their own language and minimal
advance notice even to the most fervent advocates of CACs in the G-7, was explicitly described
by Mexican debt managers and their lawyers as a claim to autonomy: they were going to thwart
the IMF bankruptcy initiative and preempt foreign meddling with their contracts in one fell
swoop (Gelpern and Gulati 2007).
***
The need for CACs and the need for government intervention to implement CACs both
rested on a solid foundation of economic theory, albeit in something of an empirical vacuum.
However, emerging markets debt managers who inserted CACs in their contracts, as well as the
market participants and the law practitioners involved, most often attributed the market shift to
different kinds of factors: political and institutional imperatives to defend private markets from
public regulation and to preserve national autonomy. For their part, most officials who publicly
promoted CACs and fluently recited the background theory, also privately expressed puzzlement
at how they came to be so prominent in the policy mix. Our interviews after CACs had
conquered the New York market seem to suggest that their success had a tenuous connection to
their function in sovereign debt contracts, untested at the time. Instead, CACs acquired multiple
contingent, constructed meanings: depending on the context, their job might be to signal an end
to bailouts, to defeat SDRM, or to reassert national autonomy over government debt contracts.
CACs were not just socially embedded; they were contract tofu—capable of taking on multiple
policy flavors to carry political messages under the guise of market-based technique. These
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messages in turn helped market participants and governments negotiate crisis management, loss
distribution, and their respective places in the foreign sovereign bond market in the late 1990s
and early 2000s.
In sum, CACs in 2003 neatly illustrated established contract theories and theories for
government intervention, and a parallel anti-theory where debtors and creditors alike insisted that
they did not change their contracts to improve the way they worked. A decade on, we heard the
same story in a very different setting.

Part III: Into the Mainstream
Below we recount the story of CACs’ return in Europe beginning in 2010. At this
writing, European member states are on track to adopt CACs across the board in their long-term
bonds issued after January 2013. In terms of market size and global economic significance, the
European initiative dwarfs the contractual revolution of 2003. If successful, it would bring
uniform CACs to a $10 trillion market in rich-country domestic debt, with virtually all new
issues instantly bound to use them. The earlier wave of adoption successfully targeted roughly
$300 billion in New York-law debt of developing countries. As before, we heard conflicting
accounts of why policy makers and market participants turned to CACs. We relate them below.
First, CACs were a mechanism to encourage private creditors to restructure and a signal that
Europe would not bail out weaker members and their creditors. Second, CACs were a
commitment that European crisis managers would be guided by clear and transparent rules and a
distinct commitment that these rules would be uniform across the union. Third, for some
European policy makers, CACs were a path to market discipline, opening the prospect that
Greece would no longer hide behind German credit. Fourth, CACs were a means of negotiating
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asset hierarchy and loss distribution among European member states as they constructed an
integrated market in government debt – they had become (somewhat incredibly) part of the
language for negotiating the distributive bargain of federalism in Europe. The fifth story is about
CACs as a legal and debt management technique, and the challenge of reconciling a functional
contract provision with multiple overlapping political missions.
By itself, each account is at best incomplete, and often wrong. Together, they offer a window
into the role of private law in the construction of financial markets and the management of
financial crises.
A. CACs as Burden Sharing
Greece’s debt troubles came to light in the fall of 2009. For much of the next year,
European politicians stuck to four positions in growing tension with one another and the facts:
first, Greece was solvent and did not need a debt restructuring; second, Greece would not get a
bailout because EU treaties barred fiscal transfers and central bank financing; third, Greece was
unique; and fourth, the Euro was safe. After two reform programs, EU and IMF rescue packages,
and an ECB bond buying initiative failed to stem the bleeding, consensus began to shift in favor
of a comprehensive European crisis response mechanism. What shape that mechanism would
take was an open question in mid-2010. One thing was clear: it would involve large-scale
emergency transfers among member states, which in turn created the twin political imperatives
of conditionality and “private sector involvement,” or PSI. 9 Conditionality meant big policy

9

The acronym had been used in the 1990s primarily to connote emerging market bond restructuring, part of the
effort to reform “international financial architecture” in the wake of the Mexican and Asian crises (See e.g., Roubini
and Setser 2004). It was revived and took on broader significance in the European crisis from 2010 on.
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concessions on the part of crisis-stricken members. PSI was a 1990s euphemism for concessions
from private creditors, or debt restructuring.
Institutional design options included a version of the 2003 SDRM, proposed by Krueger
and colleagues, and a regional monetary fund with debt resolution powers (Sapir et al. 2010;
Gros and Mayer 2010). Both were public ordering moves, and implied ceding sovereignty on the
part of member states. With these proposals in the background, French and German leaders held
an emergency summit in Deauville in October 2010 to chart the way forward. By all accounts, it
was the turning point that brought CACs to Europe.
When they returned from their iconic beach walk in Deauville, President Sarkozy and
Chancellor Merkel instructed their staff to prepare a statement that included, among other crisis
measures, a promise to adopt “necessary arrangements for an [sic] adequate participation of
private creditors” in financing the recovery programs of crisis-stricken countries (FrancoGerman Declaration 2010). PSI revival had begun. CACs were not mentioned publicly by name
until a month later, but they had been in the air for some time: an Italian member of the ECB
Board even publicly supported their adoption in remarks before the European parliament in
September (Bini Smaghi 2010). Officials present at Deauville recalled that specific instructions
to adopt CACs came then, and from on high. According to one, “If the President of France and
the Chancellor of Germany say something, you have got to do it. To me—I am not a lawyer—it
was a political instruction to us ...” (Int.A38). Soon after Deauville, a Finnish paper advocating
CACs was leaked to the press (Strupczewski 2010). A European journalist quoted anonymous
officials reporting that after Deauville, "[t]hrough subsequent meetings this was then adopted and
adapted by the European Council, leading to the agreed standard form euro area CACs for
adoption from 1.1.2013." (Int.B13)
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The post-Deauville mandate might strike an outside observer as odd for four reasons.
First, it primarily (if implicitly) addressed itself to the domestic debt of rich countries—the “Big
Debt” category we identified earlier in the paper, which accounts for over 80% of all outstanding
government securities, as compared to the 1% representing all foreign debt securities of
developing countries. What little foreign debt Europe had issued was mostly under English law,
and already had CACs. European governments had already committed to use CACs in their
foreign law debt in April 2003 (EFC 2003, 2004). To our knowledge, before Deauville, no policy
maker had tried to use the CACs in Greek or any other European debt, or to take advantage of
accumulated research on the subject to see whether they could be used in the Greek crisis.
Second, in contrast to the 1990s and 2000s, no policy maker had identified a collective action
problem for Collective Action Clauses to solve in Europe. Eurozone government debt was held
overwhelmingly by large regulated institutions, and increasingly by other governments and
central banks. These are not hard to locate, and relatively easy to coordinate through informal
suasion, regulation and diplomacy. In some countries such as Spain and Ireland, most of the
problem debt was private, and technically could be restructured using domestic corporate
bankruptcy and bank resolution laws. 10 Third, CACs had been sold in 2003 as a market solution.
Once debtors and creditors decided to move, everyone expected a healthy competition among
clause designs, with the market eventually choosing the best. To this day, not all issuers use
CACs in New York, and emerging markets CACs exhibit significant variation (Bradley and
Gulati 2012, Gelpern and Gulati 2009). In Europe in 2010, the rhetoric of CACs was used
instead to dress up a centrally-mandated set of uniform clauses. Why?

10

To the extent these laws were inadequate to the task, the response would be to reform them, not to tinker with
sovereign debt contracts.
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A remarkable number of observers attribute CACs to a mix of ignorance, desperation,
and failure of planning. When we asked how CACs made it onto the policy agenda in 2010, we
typically heard similar answers from those involved in the previous iterations of contract reform:
[S]ounds like someone needed something to say about orderly/market friendly
restructuring and CACs came out of their mouths… (Int.C1)
Someone remembered the debates of the 1990s and pulled a German memo from the
1990s … (Int.A31)
One person in the room … says, ‘Wait, I remember fifteen years ago there were four
letters … and three letters … I don’t remember the four, but the three is CAC …’ It was
totemic – says there will be some burden-sharing. (Int.A13)
How many lawyers do you think they had in that room?? (Int.A35)
The outside story was that European politicians, especially those in Germany, realized
that they were on the hook for future rescue operations, and needed to show their voters that
greedy bankers would share some of the financing burden. With policy makers thus pushed
against the wall, someone remembered that CACs stood for burden-sharing, and stuck them in a
statement as proof of seriousness or somesuch.
Several outside accounts attribute the compromise to ECB head Jean-Claude Trichet
taking advantage of the others’ ignorance. One version dates the agreement on CACs to the
Eurogroup statement in November. It was well-known by then that German officials had favored
statutory bankruptcy, but faced vigorous opposition from most of their European counterparts,
who shared Trichet’s worry about market contagion from a Eurozone debt restructuring. Trichet
drew on his experience overseeing official debt restructuring decades earlier, and used CACs to
diffuse German radicalism:
On November 28th, at that meeting, Trichet was there. He had been [head of] the Paris
Club. He is a gifted technocrat. That was a high level meeting and the others there
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might not have known what they were signing off on when they agreed to CACs. But
Trichet knew. (Int.B10)
Those claiming to have had direct or indirect involvement in the events at Deauville
credit German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble with the rise of CACs. Far from a lastminute scramble, they describe a delicate compromise that took months of planning and
bureaucratic maneuvering. It is true that German officials were under domestic political pressure
to stick it to private creditors, as more and more people realized the Greek crisis would not be
solved quickly. One official described the realization that led to CACs this way: “The Greek
black hole is getting bigger. And we are going to keep paying to bail them out.” (Int.A30) By
then, forswearing bailouts was hardly an option: No-Bailouts was the starting position, enshrined
in EU treaties, and one that looked increasingly untenable. It would have to be modified to
introduce flexibility to finance distressed countries in crisis, provided the financing burden was
shared, and flexibility were contained within clear institutional boundaries under the new
standing European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
It so happened that German officials were already committed to an institutional design of
sorts. The German Government Coalition Agreement in the summer of 2009 contained a pledge,
included at the behest of debt relief advocates, to promote international sovereign bankruptcy to
address the problem of illegitimate debts in poor countries. Some of the implementation papers
written in connection with this domestic political undertaking were making rounds in the finance
ministry just as the Greek statistics scandal broke. They were put to immediate use, though not
quite the one that the original authors had expected. (Int.A14)
At least some of the people involved in crafting the German position in the finance
ministry were well-aware of the CAC-SDRM controversy and the challenge that other
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bankruptcy proposals had faced. CACs were a familiar and logical back-up. Economists and
lawyers from inside and outside Germany, who attended European negotiating sessions, all
suggest that the German team had a better understanding of CACs than any of the others.
(Int.A23) Moreover, most were convinced that Schauble (a lawyer by training) was personally
informed and involved in the decisions involving CAC advocacy. German finance ministry staff
were tasked in the summer of 2010 at the latest with researching CACs down to the technical
details. One U.S. practitioner reports being summoned to the German finance ministry that
summer, and seeing a desk covered with a decade’s worth of academic research on CACs.
(Int.A4, Int.B7). This put Germany in a position to offer an alternative when the others rejected
bankruptcy. 11
Ultimately it is unimportant whether the Germans outwitted the French, or vice versa. All
accounts converge around the idea that CACs were a fallback, a compromise meant to signal that
Europe would ask private creditors to contribute, but “at least signal that we were not doing
something extraordinary.” (Bini Smaghi 2010, Int.A38) But of course they were doing
something extraordinary and different: European CACs were proposed as an integral part of the
standing European crisis resolution mechanism and the new political bargain underpinning the
European sovereign debt market. They would be mandated by those who had the power to
enforce their adoption and uniformity, in a category of debt that did not seem prone to
coordination problems, even in theory.

11
Some of our French and German interlocutors attributed the outcome of Eurogroup negotiations to the difference
between French and German bureaucracies. Many French finance ministry staff serve a rotation on the secretariat of
the Paris Club of official bilateral creditors, which may have given them insight into poor and emerging markets
sovereign debt, and the CACs-SDRM debates of old. (Int.A37) On the other hand, German finance ministry officials
are more likely to have legal training, and to be in contact with private law firms familiar with CACs from sovereign
and German corporate bond reforms. (Int.B7)
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The introduction of CACs was deliberate; however, those who attribute their appearance
to uninformed desperation were right in one sense. CACs’ function in late 2010 seemed to be
mostly about market and political messaging: creditors were put on notice that they would be
“involved” in debt relief, and voters in surplus states were told that private creditors would be
footing some of the crisis bill. The success of the message at the outset depended on a peculiar
mix of audience knowledge and ignorance. Markets would accept CACs if they remembered
them as the benign reform that had diffused the last PSI flare-up and ended SDRM. Citizens
would believe the new distribution bargain underpinning government debt markets if they saw
CACs as a tool to extract concessions from private creditors. Both groups would do well not to
ask hard questions about how emerging market foreign bond contract techniques might work in
rich countries’ domestic debt.
B. CACs as Market Rules
The 2003 CAC initiative went out of its way to show that CACs were an organic market
development; its successor in 2010 was a universal mandate. In 2003, officials worked
vigorously to “nudge” the market to its senses, but Taylor and his colleagues were scrupulous to
avoid mandating any clauses, much less uniform clauses in any particular form. Anything
different would have been inconsistent with their faith in market forces and their belief that all
that the markets needed was a nudge. In their view, CACs issued with the G-10 report were a
concrete alternative to unanimity, which could be adopted wholesale or could serve as the basis
for customization. In fact, the degree of variation between and even within debt stocks after 2003
was remarkable (Gelpern and Gulati 2009). In contrast, in 2010, the “political instruction” to
European officials was “that CACs should be standard and identical.” (Int.A37). One lawyer
representing an early CAC adopter in the emerging markets observed:
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When we did CACs in 2003, we were careful about testing the markets with different types of
clauses -- Mexico did 75%, Brazil 85%, . . . other variations as well. We wanted to see what the
market would accept. The Euro CACs impose a mandatory scheme . . .will the market accept
it?(Int. B2)

To be sure, in 2003, the proponents of CACs were foisting them on other sovereigns they
could not control. In 2010, European issuers were mandating CACs for themselves. But the
mandate applied to all European issuers, was uniform in content, and was embedded in a treaty
obligation, not case-by-case issuer choice. One explanation for the difference might be that
CACs’ job as bankruptcy deflector loomed large throughout 2002-2003, but was accomplished
up front in 2010. SDRM lingered for over a year; European sovereign bankruptcy appeared to
lose viability in a matter of months. But in the minds of their proponents, CACs had other work
to do. Over and over, we heard that Germany in particular wanted a rulebook to manage future
crises, and that CACs had an important place in the rulebook. In 2010, we found many more
policy makers sharing John Taylor’s faith in CACs’ proto-bankruptcy potential, even though no
new evidence for or against had emerged between 2003 and 2010. A German official described
CACs as the opposite of “ex-post blackmail” that seemed to prevail in the ongoing crisis.
(Int.A30). A central bank lawyer echoed the sentiment:
There is no such thing as a sovereign insolvency process. CACs are a way for sovereigns
to create a process – an enlightened, pro-market [process]. … The very creation of it is
arguably against the sovereign. (Int. A21)
An academic who consulted with German government officials at the time observed:
I remember in 2010 that the guys from the Ministry of Finance were running around
underlining their will to action and portraying the introduction of CACs as panacea to all
the problems. The sense, at the time, was that the CACs would make everything more
orderly. No holdouts, no ad-hoc rules by avoiding holdouts … [T]here is a VERY strong
sense here that we need better rules (we Germans love rules) and this whole
restructuring thing looked chaotic. The gut reaction to about 95% of higher-ranking
officials … is that we need a new "orderly debt restructuring regime", setting rules and
calming the chaos. Schäuble initially tried to push for a new type of SDRM, an initiative
called the "Berlin Club" at the time, but the first (un)official whitepapers were a disaster,
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so this was shelved. The alternative then was to rely on something that sounded easier
and still like a rules-based crisis resolution mechanism. (Int.B7)
This was much bigger than the caricature of rule-loving Germans. Creating a uniform
rule-bound sovereign debt market in Europe, and giving contract clauses a leading role in
advancing and harmonizing the rule system, is especially significant in light of the fact that the
vast majority of all the debt at issue was governed by domestic law of the member states. The
2003 initiative expressly excluded domestic debt, and Europe’s earlier promise to use CACs was
scrupulously limited to foreign issues designed to create a demonstration effect for the emerging
markets, “to lead by example” (EFC 2004). As we noted at the start of the paper, sovereign
debtors wield enormous influence over the accounting and regulatory treatment of their domestic
debt; they can do much by law, regulation, and political pressure to create captive domestic
demand for their debt and to force its restructuring. Domestic debt contracts (where they exist
and look like contracts) rarely provide for default, and with good reason: default in this category
of debt is least likely to be determined by contract. Standardizing EU domestic sovereign debt
documentation would be a big step in any case; it is radical to start the standardization process
with modification provisions relevant only in the shadow of default. 12
EU lawyers involved in the exercise observed that the idea of CACs as uniform rules
constraining the sovereign stood in some tension with their role of signaling investor losses:
Civilized countries such as the Euro area should have a process. But that was not the
intent at all. It was about signaling of investor losses. (Int.A15)
The tension spilled out into the open when Greece finally moved to restructure its debt.
At the onset of the crisis, Greece like the rest of Europe had a debt stock that was over 90%

12

It is more radical still if one were to maintain the view of EU domestic debt as risk-free, with default out of the
question.
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local-law bonds. As we have noted earlier, such domestic debt in Greece and elsewhere had
precious few contract terms. That in turn might have meant that they were not subject to
restructuring at all (a signal of their risk-free status), or absent 100% consent from the
creditors—or that the contract was silent on the matter and other sources of law would fill in the
gap. Greece’s lawyers realized that they could use the fact that these bonds were governed by
local law to legislate amendment provisions, including ones resembling CACs, across the entire
Euro 350 billion stock of domestic government bonds. The idea was initially decried as crazy,
contrary to European Human Rights laws, international law, the Greek constitution, and the
German constitution among others. But as the crisis worsened between 2010 and 2012, the din
subsided and, by February 2012, changing Greek law was one of the only options left for Greece.
(Zettelmeyer et al. 2012)
The Greek parliament enacted the Greek Bondholder Law, which allowed two-thirds of
its bondholders to amend its domestic bonds by a simple majority vote across series, and bind the
rest. In one fell swoop, this move lifted the prospects of a successful restructuring, and
transformed the CAC debate. It demonstrated sovereign debtors’ capacity to alter the terms of
their domestic debt by fiat, and raised doubts about the relevance of any contract terms in
domestic debt. It also reaffirmed the rhetorical power of CACs. Attaching the contractual label to
retroactive legislation somehow made it more publicly palatable. 13
At a large law firm gathering in London several months after the Greek debt exchange,
the air was thick with outrage: over and over again, participants were asked whether retroactively

13

At least one member of the creditor committee in the Greek restructuring has pointed out that the Greek
Bondholder Law was enacted following consultation with the creditors (or at least a substantial majority of them),
and was therefore less coercive than it might seem. (Int.C11).
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amending Greek bond contracts undermined the Rule of Law. Some called the move “heinous,”
others foretold quick retribution from the markets. (Int.A40) Yet for others, the abusiveness of
the Greek “retro-CACs” conclusively demonstrated the need for common rules, now represented
by a package of real CACs purportedly fashioned after the G-10 template using “IMF best
practices.”
There were three problems with this new rulebook. First, member states promised to
adopt the new CACs, not to use them in crisis. A treaty commitment that “[c]ollective action
clauses shall be included, as of 1 January 2013, in all new euro area government securities, with
maturity above one year, in a way which ensures that their legal impact is identical” 14 said
nothing about the way in which a government would go about restructuring its debt if and when
it needed to. Officials might have genuinely intended to bind themselves to use the new CACs,
but they certainly did not by the terms of their treaty (Cf. Tirado 2012). 15 The second problem
was that the new CACs did not in fact follow the G-10 template—quite the opposite. According
to one lawyer involved in the drafting, while the G-10 CACs were for emerging markets
countries where default was a regular occurrence, European CACs were “designed for debtors
that do not default” (Greek restructuring notwithstanding) (Int.A27). They used lower voting
thresholds, gave more procedural options, and imposed fewer voting qualifications on EU
sovereign debtors compared to prevailing documentation standard for developing counties.
Sovereign issuers at the top of the asset hierarchy would retain flexibility in debt restructuring—
presumably on the theory that they could be trusted—even as they sought to appear rule-bound

14

Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Art. 12(3).
This is entirely consistent with CACs’ limited history in the emerging markets: sovereigns that have CACs in their
contracts have the discretion to invoke them; some do, others do not, for strategic and tactical reasons of their own
(Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2006, Gelpern and Gulati 2009). See also note 17 infra.
15
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in their contracts (Pistor 2013). Third, to the extent IMF best practices for CACs existed,
Eurozone governments did precious little to figure out what they might be, let alone follow them.
Those involved in the drafting tried and failed to get the IMF to endorse the new CACs’ as
conforming to their guidance. (Int.A12)
In sum, the crisis gave rise to genuine demand for a rulebook to govern European
sovereign debt markets. Yet when it came time to draft the rules, the result was soft and
noncommittal. European member states retain control in the next round of restructuring,
notwithstanding all the treaty and contract work undertaken to create binding rules on their
behalf. Even their invocation of market standards and policy practices turned out to be
metaphorical. G-10 models and IMF practices might represent hard constraints for the
developing countries on the global financial periphery; 16 in Europe, they were rhetoric.
C. CACs as Market Discipline
The first question one might expect rational market actors to ask about proposals for new
contract clauses is a simple one: How much will it cost? If a new provision reduces the cost of
capital to the issuer, without causing externalities, everyone involved should want it – the issuer,
the creditors and the regulators. CACs, according to their proponents, should make all three sets
of actors happier. Issuers and creditors are better off because CACs should reduce ex post
renegotiation costs without unduly increasing ex ante moral hazard costs. The official sector

16

Even on the global periphery, the choice to deploy CACs in a restructuring was to a large extent with the debtor.
The decision to restructure may be driven by rich donors demanding burden-sharing; however, the method of
restructuring was generally up to the country. Once the debtor chooses CACs as its preferred restructuring method,
the extent to which it would be constrained depends on whether the contract follows emerging market or EU
template.
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reduces its costs because CACs should promote orderly restructuring, which has fewer spillover
effects and reduces the pressure for bailouts.
There are skeptics. Their primary argument is that sovereigns already have plenty of
restructuring techniques and bargaining leverage in the form of sovereign immunity to reduce
their debts whether they need to or not: witness the successful restructurings of countries like
Ukraine, Pakistan, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Moldova, and others
(Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2006). Tracking contract modification literature, they argue that
making restructurings even easier would encourage debtors to misbehave more. The end result
would be higher cost of capital and less market access, especially for the poorest nations. For
believers in market forces, the fact that CACs did not find favor with investors in sovereign
bonds for 200 years was telling evidence that they were not needed.
The question of the actual and optimal balance between moral hazard and renegotiation
costs is empirically verifiable. A cottage industry of CAC pricing studies developed in the
period between 1999 and 2003, with most of the studies emerging from the research departments
of official sector institutions such as the IMF. By contrast, in the Euro CAC initiative context,
there has been little impetus for new CAC pricing studies; almost as if the issue had been
decided … except that it hadn’t.
In the first generation of CAC studies, the empiricists found two sets of results (Haseler
2009 reviews the literature). One group of studies reported that CACs had no impact on debt
prices. In other words, they produced neither a benefit nor a penalty (Becker et al. 2003;
Gugiatti and Richards 2003). The implication of these studies is either that the market perceived
CACs to be worthless, or that the increase in moral hazard costs and decrease in renegotiation
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costs were in perfect equipoise so as to cancel each other out. The second set of studies found
that CACs lowered costs of borrowing for the richer nations (where moral hazard costs were
likely to be low), but increased them for the poorer nations (where moral hazard costs were
likely to be high) (Eichengreen and Mody 2004). Together, the two sets of studies prepared with
an eye to CAC adoption by poor and middle-income countries suggested no real value for such
countries in adding CACs. Pricing advantages for the richest nations were irrelevant to the first
wave of initiatives, where the rich were foisting CACs on the poor so they would no longer need
to bail them out.
In the 2003 initiative, the first set of studies (showing zero pricing effects) was used to
show that CACs would produce no pricing penalty. No one seemed to care about the implication
that CAC produced no benefits to the contracting parties. And the second set of studies was
simply ignored.
When we did our first round of interviews in 2004-2006, we first assumed that these
pricing studies had played a central role in the debates about CACs. They had not. When we
asked officials and market participants about them, they dismissed the studies as meaningless.
The majority seemed uninterested. Markets didn’t price contract terms, seemed to be the
dominant view among policy makers, market participants, and even the lawyers who put untold
time and energy into designing them:
There is lot of talk, it is overstated -- the extent to which investors in primary issuances look at
the contracts, look at the dispute resolution provisions and say, ‘It will cost another seven basis
points.’ … They never look beyond first page of the prospectus. (Int.A4)

Our interlocutors did not quite say that investors were stupid or irresponsible; merely that they
were making a risk management decision. For some investors, the uncertainties surrounding any
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given crisis path could make it impossible or not worth their while to price particular methods of
restructuring. This assessment could change across countries and over time.
The first generation of pricing studies compared the prices of bonds under English law
that had used CACs for over a decade, to those under New York law that had not. For the few
who bothered to complain about these studies, there were three main issues.

First, the early

studies simply assumed that the contracts under English law and New York law were identical
except for the CACs. But they were not. Not only were there other systematic differences
between English law and New York law bonds (for example, the former typically required a
mandatory meeting before any changes to the bond terms could occur), but there were also
differences in the terms of bonds among issuers within those jurisdictions (Brazil, for example,
might be using different dispute resolution terms than Mexico under English law). Second, the
studies had assumed that the legal regimes were identical; but there are significant differences
between English law and New York law (the same contract terms can mean different things
under the two different regimes). Third, the early studies only examined one type of CAC – the
votes required to alter payment terms. But there were at least four other types of CACs on the
table (for acceleration, for the alternation of non-payment terms, for aggregation across different
bonds, and for bondholder representatives/trustees). Maybe these problems with the first
generation of studies were at the heart of justified skepticism about their findings.
When the most recent CAC initiative was unveiled for the Eurozone, we assumed that
there would be a demand for a CAC study that remedied the problems in the prior studies.
Nearly a decade into widespread adoption of CACs, the data was now available to control for the
flaws identified. One of us attempted a study using the new data, and came up with results at
odds with the prior studies. CACs appeared to bring a pricing benefit – they lowered the cost of
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capital for the weakest countries, and made little difference for the stronger ones (Bradley and
Gulati 2012).
For the most part, the reaction to the new study was much the same as to the old: a
collective yawn. For advocates of CACs, the result was attractive. However, they did not need
the data, because they no longer needed to sell CACs to issuers. Unlike 2002-2003, where the
official sector had to plead with Mexico to adopt CACs, in 2010, Europe had made the decision
for itself. It could then simply mandate CACs across the union and call it a market alternative to
bankruptcy. Member state treasury officials were on board with CACs in principle, even if they
grumbled about the timing:
[CACs] are a positive in itself, but there is a question of timing. … When you introduce
CACs in a stressed time like this, you tell investors not to buy. CACs help organization, a
positive in case you have to restructure. If you assume that sometime in the future there
will be PSI, CACs make the process easier. … We cannot say PSI will never happen. In
the long-term, no one can say. (Int.A1)

We were surprised to discover that debt managers in at least one small and vulnerable economy
did not seem to know about CACs or their price implications, nor care about either. If CACs
were relevant at all, it would be to issuers like this. On the other hand, some of the debt managers
who were interested in pricing research as a general matter said that our studies of emerging
market debt in the decade preceding the European crisis were simply irrelevant to Europe. From
this perspective, the price effect was simply unknowable, since there was no closer analogue to
be had. In any event, the political mandate to adopt CACs issued before any new studies could
have been commissioned (Int. A25). The policy presumption in favor was overwhelming,
presumably barring credible evidence of a price penalty.
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We were in for a surprise, however, when we discussed the new pricing study with
German officials and their occasional advisers. They offered a very different kind of skepticism:
as part of the new rule-bound process, they wanted CACs to raise the borrowing costs for Greece
and other borrowers on the periphery:
Your pricing studies came up, but nobody believed them. People thought CACs would
increase the borrowing costs for weaker Eurozone countries, and that was a good thing.
(Int.A2)
CACs are a good idea – there will be an effect on the premium, and countries will watch
their borrowing. (Int. A30)
Yet, only when viewed in the context of other permanent changes made to the EU
institutional structure as a result of this crisis can the CAC introduction make sense. …
[T]they are essentially a way in which “tail end risk” is left at the table to prevent
excessive convergence of eurozone bond spreads a’la what was seen pre-crisis. … As
such, CACs are an instrument to make sure – unlike the case pre-crisis – that financial
markets pay attention to EU fiscal surveillance. … Unless the CACs … help differentiate
rates and raise the cost of borrowing for non-core countries vs. core, they will have
failed. (Int.C10)

At least for some German officials and European observers, part of CACs’ work was to
discipline profligate states on the periphery. Introducing the same private law device across EU
debt would lead to market discipline and hard budget constraints in the south, and preserve
sovereign flexibility in the north. In stark contrast to the official proponents of CACs in 2003, the
new group seemed to believe that CACs would make restructuring more likely, and saw that as a
good thing. With a “civilized” restructuring route laid out before them, the markets would know
the difference between Germany and Greece, which should put pressure on Greece to control its
borrowing ex ante.
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The view of discipline was kept private; publicly, CACs were being marketed as a winwin proposition for debtors and creditors alike. By announcing the decision three years ahead of
expected implementation, the EU would prepare the markets to manage risks better. Finance
officials and debt managers in more vulnerable countries pushed back vocally. Far from an
orderly outcome down the road, officials in Spain, Portugal, and others on the periphery saw a
dramatic increase in spreads today, which they attributed with varying degrees of emotion to the
announcement of CACs and PSI. One of them pointed to a sharp spike on the chart, reproduced
in Fig. 2, illustrating a jump in Spain’s borrowing costs, which he attributed to the PSI/CAC
announcement. Virtually every debt manager with whom we met told the same story.
Figure 2

Spanish Government Bond Yields March 2010-March 2012 (Source: Bloomberg)
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In sum, policy makers had divergent but equally instrumental interests in the pricing
studies. Those in charge had made the policy decisions and needed pricing studies for marketing.
In 2003, the marketing message was that CACs would not raise your borrowing costs, a view
that Mexico sought to entrench with its offering. At least for some participants in 2010, the
initiative had a thinly veiled subtext: it might ensure that Greece and others got their
comeuppance after borrowing for years at near-German rates in the expectation of German
backing.

41

Submission Draft b February 2, 2013 – Comments Welcome

D. CACs as Hierarchy
As October sun set over Montmartre, our interlocutor contemplated Europe’s decline.
The few times he touched the merits of CACs, this prominent economist with public and private
sector experience—scoffed at their theoretical virtues. But we hardly ever got to the merits.
Instead, the conversation kept coming back to Belize and Zimbabwe. If France were to issue debt
with CACs, French debt would become “on par with Zimbabwe and Belize … a symbol of no
more Europe—like Belize, not like the U.S. Treasuries.” (Int.A5) Variations on the abiding
worry about Europe going the way of “Argentina, Pakistan, Ukraine, Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire”
dominate the latest chapter in the public life of CACs (Beesley 2011). 17
In some ways, the debate in 2010 was no different from the one in 2003: it was all about
whether CACs affected the probability of restructuring, and thereby the status of sovereign debt
contracts with CACs in the financial asset hierarchy. Proponents insisted that CACs only made
restructuring more orderly if and when it was already inevitable. Skeptics said either that “more
orderly” meant “easier” and therefore “more likely,” or that, at a minimum, adopting CACs sent
a signal that restructuring was no longer off-limits. We touched on both sides of the argument in
our discussion of the pricing studies earlier. In Europe, it came with an additional twist. Before
the Greek crisis, much or all Eurozone sovereign debt was treated as a risk-free reserve asset, in
the same category as the U.S. Treasuries and in contrast to sovereign credit instruments issued by

17
All but one country in this list featured prominently in the recent history of sovereign debt restructuring.
Zimbabwe stood out—and was oddly prominent in several accounts of our European interlocutors. As one
multilateral development bank official observed to us, Zimbabwe’s problem was hyperinflation, not coercive debt
restructuring using Collective Action Clauses. To our knowledge, no one has studied Zimbabwe’s debt contracts for
CACs or any other restructuring terms. It was instead the perennial bogeyman in the European morality tales, the
end of the slippery slope where Europe would end up if it did not stop in time.
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countries such as Argentina or Belize. To many in Europe, acknowledging the possibility of
restructuring would not be a matter of incremental change in the risk premium, it would be a
qualitative shift in the nature of European sovereign debt: what had been money would instantly
turn into ordinary IOUs. This position was most prominently associated with Trichet and
frequently repeated by our French contacts. As the crisis wore on, policy makers from Greece,
Portugal, and Spain objected to PSI and CACs on timing grounds; “the French objection” was
absolute: if you had CACs in your debt, your debt would cease to be the equivalent of money,
except perhaps for the captive banks at home.
Some French officials speculated that the Germans did not mind adopting CACs because
they expected them to lead to a further healthy price differentiation. German government debt
securities would come out on top and retain their information-insensitive “money status”. France
was less secure in its prospects of retaining such status. But French reaction was hardly unusual.
Adopting CACs in U.S. Treasury debt had been a red line for the U.S. Bureau of Public Debt in
the late 1990s and early 2000s. When Treasury international staff floated the idea of “leading by
example” to promote the adoption of CACs in the emerging markets, they were immediately
rebuffed. U.S. Treasury securities would not have CACs, not because anyone actually feared
restructuring, but because adopting them would signal that restructuring was conceivable. The
Bureau did not mind committing to issue with CACs in foreign currency debt, but only because
they expected it to be a null set, and thought the market would read the promise as meaningless:
the United States had not issued in foreign currency since the Carter Bonds of the 1970s.
(Int.A28) 18

18

A decade later, one of us attended a policy conference where a U.S. Treasury official was asked whether his
country would follow Europe in adopting CACs; he made it clear that this was not on the agenda. It is worth asking
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In what might be the ultimate irony of the CAC story, the large emerging markets issuers
that had led the adoption of CACs in New York in 2003 had moved on by 2010. Brazil and
Mexico now issued predominantly domestic debt, which did not have CACs. They had no plans
to adopt CACs in the debt they really cared about. They did not mind having CACs in their
foreign law debt, but it was unimportant in the grand scheme of things. A Latin American debt
manager we interviewed had only the foggiest recollection of his country’s pioneering foray into
CACs in 2003 (he got the voting thresholds wrong), observing that he never had to think about
them: about 98% of the debt stock he managed was domestic and CAC-less. (Int.A20)
One European commentator groused that European officials pointedly refused to ask the
Mexicans or the Argentines about their experience with CACs before deciding to adopt them.
(Int.A23) John Taylor, the godfather of the 2003 revolution, was not consulted in the Euro-CAC
enterprise any more than the Mexican, Brazilian, or Uruguayan protagonists of 2003. (Int.C2)
But of course this made sense, because Europe’s CACs were meant to set it apart from Mexico
and Argentina, not blur the distinction between them.
The distinction was maintained, but not the way European policy makers had envisioned
it. As if confirming the worst French nightmare, in 2010, CACs were a live issue for Europe and
for the smallest and poorest developing economies seeking to restructure. The debt hierarchy had
gone topsy turvy.

why the U.S. reaction was so different from Germany’s. We did not hear stories of latent vulnerability from anyone
in the United States, in contrast to France. On the other hand, there was no “action-forcing event” that would make
the United States reckon with the costs and benefits of CACs for its own sake, the way France and Germany had to
do thanks to Greece and their initial foray into PSI. U.S. debt was still money; no one in the market bothered to
consider its contract terms; and U.S. officials would do their utmost to keep it that way.
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Some European officials suggested that the way forward was to promote CACs in the
domestic debt of other rich countries, representing over 80% of the world’s government
securities, or over $30 trillion outstanding. If one were to buy into the idea of CACs as statusnegative, diffusing them to the United States and Japan could help remove the taint from Europe:
Personally, I'm rather neutral about the introduction of CACs at the European level. I
don't think they should have a significant impact on the financing conditions of European
countries, since they don't, per se, change the probability of restructuring, and I think
markets are aware of that, in the same way that they were aware of it when they were
introduced in the Latin American markets. The question of the liquidity of the different
strips is another question however. In any case, since we have decided to put them in
place, our objective, now, is to have them generalize to other "domestic" bond markets in
other developed countries. (Int. B14)
We ran the prospect of adopting CACs in U.S. and Japanese domestic debt by one U.S.
policy maker who worked with Japan. The response was an incredulous shaking of the head.
(Int.C4) Coincidentally, another U.S. official had just been asked to address CACs in an
international forum for the first time since the days when Taylor, Quarles, and O’Neill had led
the CAC-SDRM battles. It turned out that the 2012 Treasury had no policy position on European
CACs. Since Taylor had left at the end of the George W. Bush administration, the CAC portfolio
lay abandoned:
Between you and me, No One is following this here. I have not been asked about it in
years. (Int.A28)
When staff realized that Euro-CACs operated on domestic law debt, the objective became to
steer clear of any implications from Europe for the U.S. Treasury securities. If CACs were to
become the badge of European decline, the United States had no plans to share the pain.
E. CACs as a Technical Challenge
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Once the political decision to alter contracts was made at the EU level, the task of
drafting uniform European CACs and grafting them onto the existing debt management system
went to the Sub-Committee on EU Government Bonds and Bills, a subcabinet-level technical
group under the Economic and Financial Committee of the European Union then chaired by
French Treasury chief Philippe Mills.19 The sub-committee and individual members in turn
engaged leading sovereign debt lawyers to produce CACs by late 2011, suitable for inclusion in
the domestic bonds of 27 different governments, under as many governing law regimes, by
January 2013.
The sub-committee was both a logical and a curious choice for CAC development. It
comprises debt managers—the people in charge of issuing government debt in each member
state. When it was first established in the late 1990s, the group’s principal task was to smooth
the transition to a Euro-denominated government bond market across the region. Its mission has
since expanded to include coordinating all manner of government debt market functions. The
officials we interviewed who had represented their governments on the committee were
unanimous in describing it as a gathering of technicians running the day-to-day operations of a
risk-free debt market. Between the introduction of the Euro and the outbreak of the crisis, they
compared notes on issuance and trading mechanics and market infrastructure, and coordinated
relations with primary dealers in government debt obligations. Order, safety, routine, and
technicality ruled the day. This was not an economic policy forum, nor one given to legal
experimentation:
The nature of this group is not optimal for legal issues. … Other than in terminal state,
debt management has nothing to do with legal issues. (Int.A23)

19

http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/mandate_en.pdf, http://europa.eu/efc/index_en.htm
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Although it was not a legal forum, the members of Bonds and Bills group had primary
responsibility for marketing their governments’ debt obligations. It was natural for them to be
involved when the terms of these obligations had to change, even if the change was someone
else’s idea. As a result, the Bonds and Bills group played a part in the implementation of
Europe’s 2003 commitment to use CACs in foreign-law bonds. For that assignment, the
committee conducted a member survey and published a report in 2004 (EFC 2004). Following
the same logic, it was not surprising that the people in charge of debt management for each
member government would also be in charge of developing CACs for their debt.
On the other hand, the group’s apparent conservatism and discomfort with novel legal
issues might have raised concerns about their capacity to develop CACs that worked in a
hypothetical restructuring. In the emerging markets and Europe, debt managers were among the
most vocal opponents of CACs and bankruptcy alike. Their core mission was to borrow funds in
the market at minimal cost. In the early 2000s and again a decade later, debt restructuring was
the last thing debt managers wanted to talk about when marketing new debt. At a 2003
conference we attended, the Mexican debt manager described the problem as “talking about
morgues.” Worse yet, as noted earlier, the French were among the most hostile to the idea of
PSI. A CAC initiative under a debt managers’ group chaired by the French might just be a slow
train to nowhere—a possibility that had not gone unnoticed by CACs’ German proponents.
Although he never criticized CACs in public, in private Mills reportedly described his
predicament as being handed a baby to dress – without knowing where the baby came from, or
why it was there. (Int.A40, Int.B13) For all the rumors that Mills had reservations about the
CAC project, we are told that his actions were those of a committed adherent to it; he had been
given a task, and he was going to get it done.
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The group’s work went on largely under the radar screen, and it appears that German
fears of inaction were largely misplaced. The Bonds and Bills Sub-Committee hired the London
office of Cleary Gottlieb; and at least some of the member states came with their own lawyers in
tow. Although Cleary Gottlieb had represented Mexico in its landmark CAC offering in New
York and was an outsize presence in the sovereign debt market, there is no indication that the
firm was hired for its Mexico expertise or had drawn on it in particular. The firm’s representation
of Greece in its ongoing restructuring had to be kept separate from the EU drafting work. The
drafters engaged in extensive outreach to the financial industry (a process the committee
documents described as public consultations), shared drafts, and received fifteen sets of
comments to which they responded in the model CACs and the accompanying explanatory
documents (EFC 2012).
Committee members from peripheral member states told us that they saw the political
mandate as non-negotiable, and their job as limited to implementation:
All the statements, all the political commitments were very very strong—the prime
ministers, not technical support. It is very difficult not to implement such a high policy
decision. … The way this happened, it was not up to us to make decisions…. This group
was implementing a strong political decision. The purpose was to conclude this
procedure. And so we concluded it. (Int.A25)
What can we say – it was a political commitment of Heads of State – not always based on
technical [advice]. I don’t know how the technical knowledge of CACs came to the
political level. (Int.A23)
Yet the technical task was formidable, and even the leading lawyers steeped in CAC history and
expertise were at a loss.
Six months after Europe publicly committed to CACs, the Dutch government was due to
host a seminar on Odious Debt—a theory in public international law that would excuse successor
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states from paying the debts of corrupt or oppressive rulers that came before. The goal of the
conference was to examine the role that the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the Hague
could play in sovereign debt resolution relating to Odious Debt problems. The two dozen or so
invitees were mostly lawyers, including sovereign debt practitioners from leading London law
firms, current and former lawyers from international financial institutions, a handful of
academics, a couple of European debt managers, and executives from a leading Asian sovereign
wealth fund. At the last minute, the seminar topic changed from Odious Debt to European
CACs, and the question became: What role could the PCA play in sovereign debt resolutions in
this new world where Eurozone nations were facing the prospect of restructurings and defaults?
Inevitably, given that the Dutch debt office had co-sponsored the meeting, the mandate of the
Bonds and Bills Sub-Committee became a major topic at the conference.
Unlike the policy makers, the lawyers quickly zeroed in on the problem of adopting
standard-form clauses across non-standard and non-uniform debt contracts. The English lawyers,
perhaps relying on the reference to the G-10 template in Eurogroup communiqués, had assumed
that Eurozone countries would simply switch to issuing debt under English law and submit to the
jurisdiction of English courts. To the continental Europeans in the room, this scenario was
implausible bordering on insulting. The United Kingdom had opted out of the Eurozone; for
member states that had opted in, going to English courts would be a humiliating concession.
Others suggested Luxembourg law and Luxembourg courts—after all, some sovereign debt was
listed on the Luxembourg stock exchange. But no one in the room knew much about
Luxembourg law. Reconstituting a $10 trillion market in an unknown and untested legal space
felt imprudent. The participants finally settled on English law and dispute resolution in the PCA.
This too was a radical move: until now, the debt had been overwhelmingly domestic law,
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presumptively resolved in domestic courts of the issuing sovereign. Giving up the prerogative to
issue under the state’s own law would be a powerful symbol of ceding sovereignty—the problem
at the heart of the European crisis and response. The lawyers’ group forwarded the
recommendation to the Bonds and Bills Sub-Committee.
Although the proposal appears to have been shelved, the incident is revealing. CACs
were proposed by politicians as a potent message and an easy fix. The message was potent
because CACs were known in the market, indeed, they were of the market. In the market, they
meant consensual debt restructuring, at least for the majority of creditors, as opposed to
mandatory haircuts in bankruptcy. The fix seemed easy because CACs had been vetted by the G7 in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and have been used by the vast majority of emerging markets
issuers abroad since 2003. The G-7 had explored adopting CACs in their foreign-law bonds as
early as 1998 (a promise made easy by the fact that most G-7 issued little or no foreign law
debt). Europe raised the stakes in 2003 with an undertaking to implement a wide range of CACs
in members’ foreign-law debt, and monitoring implementation through the Bonds and Bills
group. 20 Germany even enacted legislation that made it possible for firms and foreign sovereigns
to use CACs under German law—a move more symbolically than economically significant (few
sovereigns issued under German law since the introduction of the Euro). 21 While it was not
strictly on point, this history came in handy in 2010. Politicians saw CACs as technically safe
based on the accumulated knowledge about CACs in foreign-law bonds. Even after the lawyers
had chimed in to highlight the challenge of transplanting CACs into domestic debt and

20

ECFIN/CEFCPE(2004)REP/50483 final, at http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/cacs_en.pdf
In the grand scheme of things, these efforts seem ironic, since by the time Europe had decided to lead, Mexico had
already set the only example that really mattered. And even before Mexico, no emerging markets issuer was ever
deluded into thinking that CACs in G-7 debt had any bearing on the prospects of CACs in their own debt.
21
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harmonizing domestic debt contracts, most policy makers we interviewed continued to conflate
domestic and foreign debt.
From the contract drafters’ perspective, politicians had painted themselves into a
nonsensical corner. Like everything about CACs, the challenge was a blend of rational
technicality (what would work and be acceptable in the markets) and political messaging
(burden-sharing, sovereign autonomy). As a matter of fact and contrary to the G-10 reference in
the communiqués, E.U. debt managers wanted clauses that would distinguish them from the
emerging markets issuers. Worse yet, they professed commitment to change, but in the words of
one lawyer involved in the market outreach, “They all want to keep doing exactly what they had
been doing.” (Int.A40)
Again and again we heard from the drafters and proponents of European CACs that they
were for countries that did not default, the likes of Greece, Cyprus, and other tottering periphery
economies notwithstanding. Euro-CACs would have fewer “reserve matters” whose amendment
required the highest supermajority, would have no provisions for trustees and fiscal agents to
coordinate creditors (normally absent in domestic debt, and apparently unnecessary in the
absence of coordination problems), and would not disenfranchise powerful public actors such as
central banks holding government debt, because their independence could not be questioned
(EFC 2012). The sometimes-implicit claim was that Europe had the resources and institutional
maturity, which should exempt it from discipline by contract. (Int.A27) The emerging markets
needed to be controlled. Europe could be trusted.
At the national level, new awareness of contract documentation raised specific
challenges. Dutch debt managers, used to raising billions of dollars under a one-page telex,
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balked at collective debt enforcement provisions in the CAC package. Such terms might help
control litigious creditors under New York and English law contracts, but for domestic law
bonds with no enforcement provisions to begin with, collective enforcement would amount to a
concession by the debtor. French lawyers, including both private practitioners and Treasury legal
staff, said that the G-10 model simply did not fit French legal concepts. A lawyer working with
the Bonds and Bills Sub-Committee concluded that CACs in France would require legislation,
and were likely to be tested in the Constitutional court—even if they would certainly prevail in
the end. (Int.C6) When pressed to balance their enthusiasm for uniform rules, burden-sharing
and contract autonomy, European issuers preferred to keep their old contracts. (Int.A16) As in
2003, some trade groups sought to leverage the CAC project into more creditor-friendly reforms,
such as greater transparency in EU sovereign debt documentation. For the drafting group though,
CACs were a one-way message, not an invitation to bargain.
The project of drafting Euro-CACs for countries that did not default was in tension with
two sets of inconvenient facts. First, the CAC initiative covered Greece, then in the midst of a
deep debt restructuring. The claim of risk-free Europe was flatly contradicted by the very
circumstances that prompted the CAC project. Second, the claim to good credit quality, implying
no CACs, weak CACs, or nonfunctional CACs, was made in precisely the same terms by major
emerging markets issuers such as Mexico and Brazil in the run-up to 2003. Moreover, Mexico
and Brazil made the claim from a strong fiscal position, against favorable market sentiment. If
anything, this made developing countries’ claim more credible.
Greece was also a timing problem: its restructuring, which involved retroactive
legislation and produced new English law bonds with CACs, dragged on in parallel with the
work of the Bonds and Bills Sub-Committee. Several participants and observers told us that
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European officials worried about the timing, which could undermine the claim that Greece was
unique. If Euro-CACs were released before the Greek restructuring offer, they would prompt
more questions about the difference between the European standard and the Greek exit
instruments. If the exit instruments appeared before the new market standard, Europe could at
least pretend to start on a clean slate. This helps explain the apparent delay in releasing EuroCACs, which may have been ready as early as January 2012, until after the Greek exchange in
March.
In sum, the political commitment to use CACs in the domestic bonds of EU member
states appears to have been based on technical assessments of CACs in foreign bonds. This
presented a slew of implementation challenges for debt managers and their lawyers. At the same
time, the technical work of implementation ran up against a host of political messaging
contradictions, some of which recalled Mexico in 2003. Despite committing to uniform CACs,
each issuer save for Greece (which was cut out) wanted to maximize autonomy over its own
documentation and restructuring process. Although most acknowledged the hypothetical benefit
from CACs, no one would admit needing them – because no one would admit that they might
restructure in the foreseeable future. The result was a brand new set of model clauses, distinct
from what the G-10 had proposed in 2003, and from the models used by emerging markets
issuers since. Although they made concessions to creditor concerns, notably raising several
voting thresholds, Euro-CACs paid deference to the institutional imperatives of European
member states and tried to minimize constraints on future crisis management options.
Part IV:

Conclusions

Twice over the past twenty years, a group of contract clauses took on outsize policy
importance in international finance. It is hard to fathom how a few paragraphs of legalese, buried
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in hundreds of pages of similar language, could have become the medium for negotiating the
relationship among states and markets in global and regional financial crises. The contract
flipside is equally incredible: why would counterparties fight for or resist terms that, by their
own admission, do nothing for them?
Two sets of answers to such questions have been advanced in the past. The first
emphasizes the function of CACs in overcoming bondholder coordination problems and
promoting efficient modification of contracts. Such answers run into objections by officials,
investors, and even lawyers, who insist that they were not trying to solve coordination or
modification problems, or their inability to identify such problems in Europe. The second set of
answers claims that CACs were a historical accident, a blank slate on which a specific set of
opportunistic policy makers and market participants projected their political messages. These
answers are equally troublesome because they do not explain why so much work has gone and
continues to go into the drafting of clauses to make sure that they function in particular ways.
The return of Collective Action Clauses in Europe years after the successful campaign to
adopt them in emerging markets sovereign debt issued in New York suggests additional and
more nuanced explanations. CACs in Europe took on many functions beginning in 2010. They
signaled and helped negotiate loss-sharing in financial crisis between private and official
creditors, and among European member states. They offered the promise of a uniform rule-based
approach to crisis management, albeit one on which they were unlikely to deliver. For some in
Europe they promised a way to discipline profligate governments. They were also a status
symbol: some feared that adopting CACs in public debt could cost a state its coveted place in the
global financial asset hierarchy.
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All these meanings are essential to the attempted reconstitution of the European
sovereign debt market where the implicit guarantee of the surplus member states is replaced by a
more formal arrangement for risk mutualization, complete with standing crisis management
institutions. CACs might be read as a condition on mutualization—or as a way of resisting it, to
the extent they succeeded at facilitating PSI and constrained borrowing on the periphery. The
ways in which the European CACs are drafted, and their (in)capacity to do the legal work and
generate the price effects expected of them, are essential for their success as policy, political and
communication devices. Put differently, what CACs did helped determine what they said. In this
telling, CACs look less like a blank slate and more like a precision instrument.
European member states sought to use CACs to shape their debt market in particular
ways. They wanted burden-sharing, but they also wanted to avoid the penalty of higher
borrowing costs. They did not want to be disciplined, or to give up crisis management flexibility
going forward, and—save for Greece—seemed to have the bargaining power to resist hard
constraints that come with issuing foreign law debt. And they certainly did not want CACs to
signal the demotion of their government debt from money to credit status. At this writing, the
extent to which any of these goals can be achieved, and the ultimate shape of the European
sovereign debt market, remain uncertain. Although CACs were introduced as a “lesser
alternative” to bankruptcy, some European officials are attempting to reposition them as a
stepping stone on the way to bankruptcy, which remains their ultimate goal. In an ironic twist,
Europe may eventually end up with both CACs and bankruptcy, and the technical challenge of
reconciling the two. The lesson of CACs so far is in the power of seemingly minor private law
techniques to shape public markets and institutions, often in nontransparent ways—and in the
way contracts are shaped by their public mission.
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